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This study was chartered with the purpose of evaluating the short- and 
long-term effects of using Test Pilots to fill Individual Augmentation (IA) billets in 
the support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  These aviation billets are 
essential to the test and acquisition workforce to ensure that viable new weapon 
systems are introduced to the Fleet in a timely manner, especially since test 
project workloads in Naval Aviation continue to rise.  Our study primarily 
examined helicopter programs currently delayed or at risk of going over budget 
due to reduced manning, as well as an analysis of the return on investment for 
Test Pilots when they are assigned an IA.  The following key observations were 
made during our research:  
1) Each test squadron has determined their minimum, or red-line, 
level of manning by analyzing current and future workload 
requirements.  
 
2) Test Pilots are expensive to train and the rate of return on 
investment is greatly diminished if their payback tour is 
interrupted by an IA.  
 
3) The Navy can improve its “rip to fill” way of filling IA billets.  
As a result, we have provided the following recommendations on how 
Naval Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR) can better manage the process in 
which IA billets are filled:  
1)  Seek formal exemption of project officer billets from IAs.  
2)  Increase the manning level for naval test squadrons.  
3)  Make IAs more predictable. 
4)  Assign naval test squadrons specific recurring IA billets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Project officer Test Pilots in Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Test 
Squadrons are among the 10,000 sailors serving in Individual Augmentation (IA) 
billets in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  While removed from their primary 
duties as testers, the aviation program acquisition workload continues to operate 
at a very high level in support of such priority programs as EA-18G, P-8A, E-2D, 
P-3, MV-22, MH-60, and VH-71.   
The Navy has deployed more than 46,000 IAs to joint and coalition 
commands since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.  It expects to 
increase its contribution to about 12,000 sailors on the ground in the Middle East. 
Between 40,000 and 50,000 sailors will join these commands in phases over the 
next two years to ensure current operations are not disrupted.1  
 
B. BACKGROUND 
NAVAIR Test squadrons are unique in that their Officer Corps is 
predominately comprised of Test Pilot School graduates, fulfilling billets that have 
a direct impact to the implementation of new or improved air warfare systems.  
Test Pilots must complete flight training, the United States Naval Test Pilot 
School (USNTPS), and certain Postgraduate Degree programs in order to be 
qualified.  Upon graduation from USNTPS, they are assigned to a developmental 
                                                
1  Commander Naval Installations Command. (2007). Independant Augentation Handbook. US Navy. 
 8 
test squadron as a project officer for two years.  This is considered their payback 
tour for training received at USNTPS.   
NAVAIR test squadrons are organized in the same way as operational 
Fleet squadrons, with the number of billets based on mission (project) needs.  
This Basic Allowance (BA) determines the squadron’s manning level, which is 
normally filled as a percentage of the BA.  For shore commands, the nominal 
risk-based red-line has been set at 75 percent of BA.2  Red-lines are a 
management tool to track critical manning levels.  However, the IA business rules 
state that red-lines do not restrict commands from being tasked to provide an IA 
if filling the billet will bring their manning below red-line levels.3 
IA business rules exclude certain shore and sea duty billets from IA 
selection.  The following shore duty billets are excluded: Type-6 overseas duty4, 
joint duty, non-distributable manning (students, transients), nuclear weapons 
billets (security, maintenance), nuclear propulsion coded billets5, and a portion of 
Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPTE) readiness billets (critical 
instructor, recruit division commander, production recruiters, and production 
support billets).  The following sea duty billets are excluded: Type 3 and 4 sea 
duty6; nuclear trained personnel assigned to CVN, SSN, SSBN, and SSGN class 
                                                
2  Harvey, J. C. (2008, January 6). GSA Detailing Business Rules. NAVADMIN 003/08 . 
3  Harvey, J. C. (2008, January 6). GSA Detailing Business Rules. NAVADMIN 003/08 
4 Type 6 overseas shore duty is performed at overseas land-based activities that are credited as shore duty for 
rotational purposes.  
5 Certain Nuclear propulsion billets are available for assignment with OPNAV N133 approval. 
6 Type 3 and 4 sea duty is duty performed at overseas land activities that is credited as sea duty for rotational 
purposes.  
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warships; and Special Warfare (SPECWAR) assigned to United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM).7 
NAVAIR program cost, schedule, and performance risks are increasing as 
a result of reduced manning levels for project officers.  For example, the 
Government Flight Test Director (GFTD) at Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 
Twenty One (HX-21) recently fulfilled an IA electronic warfare billet.  This created 
a gap in both a test management position and the squadron’s available test pilots 
when three major H-60 helicopter programs were concurrently involved in test.  
Ultimately, delay in Developmental or Operational test will prevent on-time 
delivery of critical aviation assets to operational squadrons, diminishing their war-
fighting capability. 
Two systems, the legacy IA Manpower Management (IAMM) process and 
the GWOT Support Assignments (GSA) process, currently operate in parallel to 
manage the Navy contingency manpower requirements. However, the system is 
in a state of transition:  
GSA detailing will capture approximately 73 percent of the 
current requirement by mid-to-late CY-2008.  The goal is to 
shift the remaining 27 percent of requirements to the GSA 
detailing process as soon as practicable.8 
  
The GSA process will attach en-route IA assignments onto Permanent Change of 
Station (PCS), or transfer, orders.  This allows service members time to prepare 
for these assignments, and for the incumbent commands to prepare for the gap 
                                                
7  Harvey, J. C. (2008, January 6). Individual Augmentation Manpower Management Business Rules. NAVADMIN 
002/08 . 
8  Harvey, J. C. (2008, January 6). Individual Augmentation Manpower Management Business Rules. NAVADMIN 
002/08 . 
 10 
in their manning level.  Although this new GSA process will not reduce the 
manning shortages created by an IA, it will help commands to better prepare for 
its impact.  GSA detailing will allow Program Offices the ability to plan for project 
delays and manning reductions in advance, instead of dealing with them on short 
notice; what the “rip to fill” IA billets are currently causing them to do.  The 
purpose of the shift is to significantly improve predictability of GSA for sailors and 
their families, enable volunteerism, improve manning stability at the unit level, 
and add detailer involvement for oversight of professional development and 
career progression.  Fleet forces will continue to fill a portion of IA requirements 
through the IAMM process until GSA detailing is fully implemented.  The goal is 
to create an environment in which GSA assignments are the standard, and the 
mid-tour IAMM assignments are the exception.9  
The current “rip to fill” process for filling IA requirements within the Naval 
Test Wings is also governed by the internal NAVAIR Instruction 1001.2, which 
prioritizes NAVAIR military personnel for selection based upon the date the 
member checked out of his last operational command or the date of return from 
the last IA assignment since reporting to NAVAIR, whichever is more recent.10  
This instruction, combined with sporadic IA requests from the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel (BUPERS), has greatly affected a squadron’s ability to plan testing 
and manage its manning levels.   
                                                
9 Harvey, J. C. (2008, January 6). Individual Augmentation Manpower Management Business Rules. NAVADMIN 
002/08 . 
10  Venlet, D. J.  (2007, August 22). Individual Augmentation Readiness Plan Instruction. NAVAIR INST 1001.2 CH-
1 . 
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Within the last few years, two main reviews have been conducted by 
NAVAIR to improve upon its process of selection.  Although our research utilized 
such data from a large sample of squadrons within Naval Test Wing Atlantic, the 
focus was on the effects of using rotary-wing Test Pilots assigned to HX-21 to fill 
IA billets.  
 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to analyze the use of rotary-wing 
Test Pilots to fill IA billets.  Secondary objectives are as follows: 
1) To determine IA levels within Naval Test Wing Atlantic. 
 
2) To incorporate a cost analysis completed by Naval Test Wing Atlantic, 
that analyzes the return on investment for a test pilot when he goes 
on an IA.  This is to help answer the question of whether it is a 
financially sound decision to fill IA billets with Test Pilots.  The cost 
analysis determines if NAVAIR recoups the cost to send pilots through 
USNTPS when they go on IA after they graduate.  
 
3) To determine stakeholders’ perception of whether the IA process can 
be managed more effectively within Naval Test Wing Atlantic. 
 





A ten-week study was conducted to investigate the ramifications of using 
NAVAIR Test Pilots to fill IAs.  Our primary client was the Commanding Officer of 
Air Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VX-1).  The purpose of this project was 
to determine if it makes sound financial sense to fill IA billets with Test Pilots 
currently serving in NAVAIR test squadrons.  The data obtained from the 
 12 
cooperation of various Developmental and Operational test squadrons is 
included to help analyze the effects of the IA program on the Naval Aviation test 
community, and in particular, HX-21.  This project is not intended to determine 
the validity or to call into question the importance of the Individual Augmentation 
program in carrying out the priorities of the National Command Authority.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
General background data on IAs, including Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) instructions and messages, were collected from the Bureau 
of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) PERS-4G website, in order to understand the 
current management guidelines.  Our consulting group attempted, without 
success, to interview a BUPERS representative for information.  This, however, 
did not have a negative affect on our research.  The current IA manning status 
within Naval Test Wing Atlantic was collected from the Wing Operations Officer 
to evaluate the most current manning situation.  Other general background data 
was obtained from the Naval Test Pilot School to determine costs to train a test 
pilot and the length of its curriculum.  
The next phase of data collection consisted of stakeholder interviews, 
which produced the most valuable information for this project.  Although our 
baseline questions were similar, many were modified to capture data from the 
unique perspectives that came with each interviewee (Appendix A).  Formal 
interviews were conducted primarily in person, using the telephone only due to 
geographical constraints.  Two Test Squadron Commanding Officers, Naval Test 
 13 
Wing Atlantic (NTWL) operations representatives, the NTWL Operations Officer, 
and the H-60 Program Manager (PMA-299) were interviewed.  Three informal 
interviews were also conducted with Test Pilots at Naval Air Station Patuxent 
River, one of whom had recently returned from an IA assignment.   Opinions and 
recommendations were gathered concerning the current and future affects of IAs 
on the Naval Aviation Test community. 
 14 
II. RESULTS 
A. IA STATUS WITHIN NAVAL TEST WING ATLANTIC (NTWL) 
 The current status of all IAs within NTWL is presented in Figure 1, taken 
from the NTWL IA Waiver Assignment Spreadsheet.  This was updated in 
February 2008 and is currently tracked by the Test Wing’s operations 
department.  There are currently fifty-four individuals from the Wing deployed on 
IA billets, nine of whom are Test Pilots (Table 1).  NTWL personnel have spent a 
total of 24,721 days deployed on IA since July 2005 (Table 2).  The average IA 
length for officers is nine months, while the average length for enlisted personnel 






















                                                
11 Stevenson, NAVAIR Individual Augmentations Implementation Affects On Naval Test Wing Atlantic, 2006. 
Table 1. Current IA levels within the Wing 























Due to these IA assignments, manning levels within the majority of these 
test squadrons are hitting critical levels.  Program test schedules and costs are at 
the mercy of this reduced manning; a backlog of testing could trickle down and 
affect the timeline of many different program schedules.  
 
B. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
The throughput of USNTPS is thirty-six students per class, two classes 
per year, with each encompassing a ten-month course of both classroom and 
flight instruction.  The cost to train an individual test pilot has been pre-
determined at approximately $700,000.12  Rigorous syllabus requirements, 
instructor and aircraft availability, as well as other external factors, limit the 
throughput to these two classes.  This, in turn, limits the availability of new 
                                                
12  Stevenson, J. (2008, February). NTWL Operations Officer. (J. Baron and C. Conlon, Interviewers) 
Table 3. Time on IA 
Figure 1.  Current IA Manning within NTWL (Source: NTWL, 2006) 
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project officers for test squadrons.  By using a combination of curriculum 
requirements with the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement 
Process (NAVRIIP),13 which tries to increase readiness while reducing costs, 
USNTPS has determined that its minimum instructor level is thirty.  Instructors 
are split between the school’s Fixed, Rotary, and System syllabi.  Although 
students are currently exempt from IAs, the staff is not.  A waiver has been 
submitted to NAVAIR to exempt staff members (Appendix B). 
 While in their payback tour following USNTPS, aircrews spend 
approximately five months assimilating into the test squadron.  This normally 
encompasses required Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS), proficiency, and 
specialty qualification training, as well as leave.  When a test pilot is removed 
from this tour for a total of fourteen months on an IA, he is able to provide only a 
five-month return for his TPS training investment (based on a 24-month payback 
tour and five-month assimilation period).  Returning test pilots interviewed stated 
that, in reality, this is reduced to only four productive months, since it typically 
takes an additional month to regain flight qualifications and proficiency, having 
been removed from a flying status for over a year.  
 This data is clearly depicted in Figure 2, a straight-line Return on 
Investment (ROI) analysis conducted by Naval Test Wing Atlantic in 2006 for a 
six- and twelve-month IA.  The numbers are based on a $666,000 cost to train (in 
                                                
      13 The Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program built upon AMSR recommendations and 
implemented a comprehensive program to fundamentally change the way the Navy provides manpower, equipment and 
training to stateside Naval Aviation commands.  
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2005) and a twenty-four-month payback period.   After pre- and post-IA requisite 
training and leave, it was determined that a twelve-month IA produces 4.5 total 
productive months in the squadron.  This results in a 34 percent ROI.  A six-






   
   
 
 
                                                
14 Stevenson, NAVAIR Individual Augmentations Implementation Affects On Naval Test Wing Atlantic, 2006. 
Figure 2.  USNTPS Graduate Return on Investment (Source: NTWL, 2006) 
 
 




























































































































C. MANAGEMENT OF THE IA PROCESS 
 
 Those interviewed expressed predominantly negative opinions about the 
IA management process.  None interviewed refuted the reasons for an Individual 
Augmentation; however, each person agreed the management process within 
NAVAIR requires improvement.  The waiver process was specifically highlighted 
as a problem.   
Currently, nearly every command within both Naval Test Wing Atlantic and 
Pacific has a unit waiver submitted for its project officers (Appendicies B-G).  
Although Waivers receive endorsements from the Test Wing’s chain of 
command, the NAVAIR Vice Commander determines priority of the waivers and 
gives ultimate approval.  “The waiver process essentially puts program priority 
decision making into the hands of one person”.15  Colonel Brodfeuhrer, 
Commanding Officer of HX-21 maintained:  
If an IA billet comes into our squadron and a waiver is granted for a 
particular pilot one week, and another IA billet comes in next week, 
the next pilot on the list is the one going on the IA and is most likely 
not going to get a waiver granted.  It does not matter if that person 
was more important to a program than the person who got the 
waiver.  It’s all just timing.  It negates the utility of a waiver.16  
 Five out of eight of those interviewed felt there was some merit to Test 
Pilots being part of the IA exclusion list from the time they start USNTPS, until 
completion of their payback tour.  All felt that the best time to fill an IA was after a 
Test Pilot completed his payback tour.  Under the current NAVAIR instruction, 
                                                
15  NTWL Operations Representatives (2008, February). NTWL Operations Department. (J. Baron and C. Conlon, 
Interviewers) 
16  Brodfeuhrer, C. (2008, February). HX-21 Commanding Officer. (C. Conlon, Interviewer) 
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when Test Pilots are fully qualified to start testing, they are at the highest point of 
visibility for an IA, as this coincides with the largest number of days removed 















                                                
17 Brodfeuhrer, C. (2008, February). HX-21 Commanding Officer. (C. Conlon, Interviewer) 













YC!!IMPACT OF THE IA PROCESS!!
 Interviews identified numerous effects that the IA process has had on the 
test community.  An increase in project workload and decrease in test efficiency 
were common outcomes expressed.  NTWL Operations department 
representatives believed,  
The results, the system test data, and the meaning of the system 
testing are still adequately being conducted; but test reporting is 
hurting.  This causes a lack of efficiency, since without proper 
documentation, testing may be repeated, which lengthens test and 
increases cost.  The library of previous results is hurting.20  
                                                
19 Aitchenson. (2008, February). VX-9 Commanding Officer. (N. Battaglia, Interviewer)  
20  NTWL Operations Representatives. (2008, February). NTWL Operations Department. (J. Baron and C. Conlon, 
Interviewers) 
 21 
The key to effective developmental testing is the project officer/engineer team.  
When this team forms early in the acquisition and testing process, and maintains 
a high degree of continuity, improved program results are recognized.  When 
continuity is lost due to project officer IA billeting, team effectiveness diminishes.   
 Captain C. Peters, the overall Navy H-60 Program Officer (PMA-299), 
voiced concerns about the affects of the IA process at the program office level: 
“Life cycle costs may increase on some programs.  Some programs are getting 
through test gates but overall quality may be in question.  It can put more risk on 
the fleet’s shoulders.”21  He went on to describe examples in current H-60 
programs.  The desired maturity level for the MH-60R/S Pre-Planned Product 
Improvement (P3I) testing was set at 700 flight hours.  According to Captain 
Peters, testing has not met half those hours due to Test Pilot manning reductions 
as a result of Individual Augmentations.  This has caused schedule delays within 
both Integrated and Operational Evaluation Test periods, and certain helicopter 
systems of P3I may not meet a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) mandated 
program freeze deadline, diminishing the utility of these new helicopters to the 
fleet users.  
 Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Twenty One (HX-21) is the only 
rotary-wing squadron within the NAVAIR Test organization.  There are four other 
fixed wing squadrons within NTWL alone.  USNTPS graduates four times more 
fixed-wing than rotary-wing pilots per year.  By comparison, HX-21 has the 
                                                
21  Peters, C. (2008, January). PMA-299 Program Manager. (J. Baron and C. Conlon, Interviewers) 
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majority of ACAT-I programs currently undergoing test within the wing.  When an 
IA is filled from HX-21, it has a proportionally larger impact on the squadron in 
both manning and programs affected than a typical fixed-wing test squadron.  As 
a former Commanding Officer of HX-21, Captain Peters pointed out that HX-21 is 
usually harder hit due to the infrastructure of the test community: “HX is already 
manned at critical levels and IAs reduce billets even more.” 22   
 HX-21 has submitted a unit IA waiver request to NAVAIR for all of its 
project officers (Appendix G).  There are currently two officers and two enlisted 
personnel deployed on IA billets.  All four are in Iraq and three of the four are 
attached to an Electronic Warfare battalion.  A graphical representation of the IA 
affect on the squadron is presented in Figure 2.  It is a Naval Aviation Readiness 
Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) metric chart for personnel manning 
at HX-21.  It shows the Ready for Tasking (RFT) gap between entitlements for 
manning necessary to execute known program tasking and current/projected 
manning.23  
                                                
22  Peters, C. (2008, January). PMA-299 Program Manager. (J. Baron and C. Conlon, Interviewers) 
23 Stevenson, NAVAIR Individual Augmentations Implementation Affects On Naval Test Wing Atlantic, 2006. 
 23 
 
  According to Colonel Brodfeuhrer, Commanding Officer of HX-21, the IA 
process can be summed up in one word: “Arbitrary.”  He states, “ . . .safety is a 
concern because project officer workload is very high and with the GFTD 
[Government Flight Test Director] gone on IA, management foresight is 
lacking.”24  In order to mitigate risk, Colonel Brodfeuhrer called his management 
team together when told the GFTD was selected for an IA.  The result of this 
meeting was a decision that HX-21 could not support two off-site test 
detachments at once. 
 Test program management is lacking at HX-21 as a result of the GFTD 
being on IA.  A GFTD is apprised of all programs within the squadron.  He is able 
to shift assets (pilots, aircrew, engineers, aircraft) from one program to another 
as program priorities change.  Project officers, though aware of other competing 
                                                
24  Brodfeuhrer, C. (2008, February). HX-21 Commanding Officer. (C. Conlon, Interviewer) 




programs under test in their squadron, normally do not have the foresight to 
effectively manage the interactions of these programs due to their focus on 
individual responsibilities.  
 The IA process within NAVAIR has had a negative effect on the naval 
aviation test and acquisition community.  The reduced manning level in both 
operational and developmental test squadrons will continue to increase test 
program timelines and costs.  Less than thorough testing endeavors, in order to 
maintain scheduling constraints, will place more risk and responsibility onto the 
Fleet, and could increase total life cycle costs of aviation programs.  Safety is a 
paramount concern because workload levels are constant, or increasing, as 
manning is reduced.  Finally, NAVAIR is not receiving the optimal return on its 
investment from USNTPS students when project officers are selected for 
Individual Augmentations during their payback tour.  
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A.  FORMALLY EXEMPT PROJECT OFFICERS 
According to the IA business model, OPNAV has the ability to exempt 
certain billets.  Naval Test Wing Atlantic should request formal exemption for 
United States Naval Test Pilot School graduates currently filling project officer 
billets during the pay-back tour.  
B.  INCREASE THE RED LINE FOR TEST SQUADRONS TO 90 PERCENT   
 The IA business model discusses variations in the red-line number 
between organizations.  An increase from the current red-line to 90 percent of BA 
would reflect the importance of test team continuity for success.  
C.  MAKE INDIVIDUAL AUGEMENTATIONS MORE PREDICTABLE 
Commanding Officers expressed a desire to have advanced notice of IA 
requirements.  If commands were aware of their requirements in advance they 
could better manage their own manpower. 
D.  ASSIGN COMMANDS SPECIFIC AUGMENTATION BILLETS 
 Many commands have noted they continue to fill the same billets.  If a 
formal long-term assignment were created, squadrons would be able to manage 
the planned rotational requirements with less impact on manning. 
E.  VOLUNTARILY EXEMPT PROJECT OFFICERS 
 NAVAIR could internally exempt project pilots.  While this would 
necessitate the use of other military members throughout NAVAIR, it could 
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